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________________________________________________________________________ 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
______________________________________________________________________ 
    
DAVID PYPER    )  
 ) APPELLANT REPLY BRIEF 
     ) 
Plaintiff-Appellee,   )  
) 
vs.      ) Case No: 20080906-CA 
  ) 
JUSTIN C. BOND, DALE M.  ) ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
and ALISON D. BOND   ) 
Defendants-Appellants  ) 
) 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
THE HONORABLE DAVID MOWER, PRESIDING 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Brian Queesenberry       Jennifer Reyes 
River View Plaza       Dorius & Reyes 
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III.   ARGUMENT 
 
1. APPELLANT IS NOT CHALLENGING THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS 
OF FACT BUT THE APPLICATION OF THOSE FACTS TO THE 
CONTROLLING CASE LAW 
 
Appellee argues Appellant has failed to marshal the evidence and thus cannot 
challenge the Trial Court’s Findings of Fact.  However, Appellee fails to understand 
Appellant is not challenging the Trial Court’s Findings of Fact.  Rather, Appellant is 
challenging the Trial Court’s application of those facts to the controlling case law and the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 69C.  In addition, Appellant is arguing the Trial 
Court did not use the correct rule pursuant to Young v. Schroeder, 37 P 252 (Supreme 
Court of the Territory of Utah 1894), Mollerup v. Storage Systems International, 569 
P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977), and Huston vs. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531 (Utah 1991). 
In the Trial Court’s Memorandum Decision, the Trial Court states: 
The following circumstances must be present for the Court to set a 
sale aside. First, the sale price should be inadequate. Young at 254.  
The inadequacy should be “so gross as. . .to shock the conscience of 
all fair and impartial minds”. . . .A moving party is not required to 
prove fraud in the purchase of property for an inadequate price. 
“Slight circumstances of unfairness in the conduct of the party 
benefited by the sale” are enough to raise the “presumption of fraud.” 
Therefore, the Court should consider any unfairness in the conduct of 
the purchasing party. 
 




This is the controlling rule relied on by the Trial Court.  This language is taken 
from Schroeder; however, this is not the rule set forth by the Supreme Court in 
Schroeder. 
 In Schroeder, the Supreme Court quotes the following passage from the United 
States Supreme Court in Graffam v. Burgess, 117 U.S. 192, 6 Sup. Ct. 686. 
From the cases here cited we may draw the general conclusion that, if 
the inadequacy of price is so gross as to shock the conscience, or if, 
in addition to gross inadequacy, the purchaser has been guilty of any 
unfairness, or has taken any undue advantage, or if the owner of the 
property or party interested has been for any other reason misled or 
surprised, then the sale will be regarded as fraudulent and void, or the 
party injured will be permitted to redeem the property sold.  Great 
inadequacy requires only slight circumstances of unfairness in the 
conduct of the party benefited by the sale and raise the presumption 
of fraud. 
 
Schroeder at 254. 
 
 At this point the Supreme Court stops quoting Graffam on continues in the Court’s 
own voice stating: 
All the cases unite in the doctrine that on gross inadequacy of price, 
coupled with irregularities attending the sale, especially when such 
irregularities are not merely formal and technical, but such as have a 
direct tendency to prevent the realizing of a fair price for the property 
sold, and are attributable to the purchaser at the sale, it is the duty of 
the courts to set the sale aside. . . . 
 
Schroeder at 254. 
 
This is the actual holding of the Supreme Court in Schroeder.  The Trial Court has 
pulled dicta out of Schroeder and used that dicta as the rule in making the Trial Court’s 
Memorandum Decision.  
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Later on in Schroeder the Supreme Court uses the term, “substantial 
irregularities,” and, in fact, determines that the sale in Schroeder was attended by such 
substantial irregularities as must have prevented a sale at a fair sum.  Schroeder at 254.  
This now becomes the rule used in Mollerup v. Storage Systems International, 569 P.2d 
1122 (Utah 1977). 
In Mollerup, the Utah Supreme Court stated, 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, a court, sitting in equity, may in 
appropriate instances extend the [redemption] period.  This Court has 
recognized that equitable principle by setting aside a sale after the 
time for redemption had expired, when the sale was attended by such 
substantial irregularities as must have prevented a sale at a fair sum, 
resulting in a gross sacrifice of the judgment creditor’s property. 
 
Thus, the rule is clear from the language of both Schroeder and Mollerup:  the sale 
itself must be attended by such substantial irregularities as must have prevented a sale at a 
fair sum.  However, the Trial Court has applied the wrong controlling rule to the facts in 
this action.  
 The Trial Court’s statement that “great inadequacy of price coupled with 
unfairness raise a presumption of fraud on Respondent’s behalf” is incorrect and 
inconsistent with the Utah Supreme Court cases dealing with this issue. 
 It should be noted that the Trial Court, after a full evidentiary hearing on this 
matter, did not find there were substantial irregularities attending the sale that prevented 
the property from being sold at a fair sum.   
It should also be noted that in all the cases dealt with by the Supreme Court 
regarding this issue, Schroeder is the only one where the Supreme Court actually sets 
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aside the sale.  The basis upon which the Supreme Court sets aside the sale in Schroeder 
is that there were in fact many substantial and serious irregularities with the sale itself.  
For instance, the creditor in Schroeder directed the land be sold in separate parcels as to 
prevent its bringing in a fair price.  In essence, the creditor influenced how the sale was 
conducted and how the property was to be sold.  The creditor took direct action in the 
sale itself and influenced the outcome.  Further, the creditor assured the debtor the 
statutory redemption period would not be relied upon. 
 In the present action, the parties stipulated that the sheriff’s sale was fair and 
conducted according to all the rules and regulations, and therefore there were no 
substantial irregularities as required by Schroeder and Mollerup.   
 Based on the above, the Trial Court applied the wrong standard in the Trial 
Court’s Memorandum Decision. 
2. THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW IS NOT ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION.  THE PROPER STANDARD IS THE APPELLATE COURT 
GIVES NO DEFERNCE TO THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING BUT REVIEWS IT 
FOR CORRECTNESS 
  
Appellee argues the proper standard is for this appeal abuse of discretion.  This 
argument is predicated on Appellee’s argument that Appellant is challenging the Trial 
Court’s Findings of Fact and has failed to marshal the evidence.  However, as stated 
above, the Appellant is not challenging the Trial Court’s Findings, but rather Appellant is 




3.  THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING WAS NOT A REASONABLE DECISION 
AND EVEN IF THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE PROPER RULE, THERE IS 
NO BASIS TO SET ASIDE THE SHERIFF SALE 
 
  Appellee next argues that the Appeal fails because the Trial Court’s decision was 
a reasonable decision. 
The decision by the Trial Court was not a reasonable decision.  Further, even if the 
Trial Court applied the correct rule, there is no basis to set aside the Sheriff sale. 
 First, the slim basis of unfairness upon which the Trial Court made its ruling 
frustrates the purpose of Rule 69C.  Rule 69C gives ample time for a debtor to address 
the sale.  Rule 69C very clearly provides safeguards if there are disputes about the 
amounts.  Finally, the Courts have even granted debtors extensions of the redemption 
period. See Mollerup.   
The Trial Court’s ruling merely states if there is a gross inadequacy of price and 
slight circumstances of unfairness the sale should be set aside.  However, the Trial Court 
fails to address Appellee’s failure follow the very clear procedures outlined in Rule 69C, 
such as paying the redemption amount into the Court, and his failure to utilize the 
remedies set forth in case law, such as petition the Court to extend the redemption period.  
The Trial Court also failed to address Appellee’s failure to show Appellents any evidence 
that Appellee actually had any money to pay the judgment. 
   The entire basis of Appellee’s claim is that Appellee tried to contact the 
Appellant’s 28 times to obtain a payoff amount. It should be noted that the greater 
amount of these contacts, as stated by Appellee, are after the redemption period had 
expired.   
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Also, the Trial Court made findings that Appellee was requesting the lien be 
removed so Appellee could obtain a loan from the bank to pay off the judgment.  Trial 
Court Memorandum Page 3, 4, 5. Thereafter, Mr. Bond and Mr. Dorius agreed they 
would not be wiling to release the lien.  This was based on the fact the Firm had had so 
many problems with Appellee in the past. R 450 p. 213. R. 450 p. 201. Appellants had 
no obligation to release the lien so that Appellee could obtain a loan.   Appellants could 
not trust Appellee to follow through with his agreements based on the history they had 
with Appellee.   
Since the Probate proceedings were concluded, Appellee had repeatedly ignored 
requests for payment.  Appellee had absolutely no contact with Appellants regarding the 
attorney fees and the judgment.  This refusal of Appellee to respond to requests for 
payment began in 2004. R. 450 p. 191.  R. 168.  It was only right before the redemption 
period was about to expire in 2007 that Appellee decided to make an effort to contact 
Appellants.   Appellants had absolutely no response from efforts to collect attorney fees 
prior to that time.  Further, Appellee filed several bankruptcies, all of which were 
dismissed by the bankruptcy court.  Therefore, Appellants did not believe they could rely 
on Appellee to follow through with any statements Appellee made.  R. 168. 
Appellee never forwarded any bank documents or loan applications or any other 
verification that Appellee had some financing available at the time.  Appellee was asking 
Appellants to take him at his word that he was going to pay off this amount with some 
loan, yet never provided any verification this was correct.  If it is correct Appellee had the 
financing available, it would have been simple to bring those documents to the 
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evidentiary hearing and say look, here is what the bank was requesting, and I could not 
obtain the amounts from Appellants.   
In addition, it would have been simple for the bank, or Appellee, to look at the 
judgment that was filed against the property.  The judgment amount was clearly stated in 
the Notice of Lien filed against the property and recorded with the County Recorder and 
contained in the Court records. All of the actions taken by Appellee were to frustrate the 
process and circumvent the rules.  Appellants had no obligation to release the lien against 
the property.  Too much time had passed and Appellants were not willing to rely on any 
statements or negations made by Appellee. 
Also, Appellee made the statement that he had financing available to pay off the 
amount, and he had the money to pay off the amount. Trial Court Memorandum page 4.  
If Appellee did in fact have the money available as he claims, why did he not tender it 
with the Court.  Appellee clearly knew what the judgment was: the judgment, notice of 
lien, etc were all personally served on the Appellee.  Further, the judgment amount was in 
the Court’s records.  Appellee could have easily looked at the Court record and then 
tendered that amount to Appellants. 
Further, Appellee could have petitioned the Trial Court for an extension of time 
for redemption, gathered the information he claims he needed, and took care of this 
matter.  (In Mollerup the debtor filed an ex-parte motion for extension on the day the 
redemption period expired.  The Court granted an extension of the redemption period but 
refused to grant a second extension after the party failed to perform.   569 P.2d 1122 at  
1123.  
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Appellee had many avenues to resolve this matter.  Instead, Appellee chose to let 
the redemption period expire and then turn on Appellants and accuse them of  some kind 
of unfairness and bad faith.  Appellant ignored this matter for four years and then made 
several phone calls right before the lapse of the redemption period and now accuses 
Appellant for acting in bad faith. 
Appellee did not take any reasonable measures to settle this matter other than 
contact Appellants and make an offer of $8,500.00 and request the lien be removed right 
before the expiration of the redemption period.   
Based on the above, the ruling by the Trial Court was not a reasonable decision.  
Even if the Trial Court had followed the correct rule, there is no basis to set aside the 
sale.  Appellee’s conduct does not warrant the setting aside of a sheriff’s sale.   Appellee 
had six months to address the redemption and approximately four years to address the 
judgment.  Appellee took no action until right before the time lapsed and offered no 
verification he had the means to settle the matter.  
 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
 In conclusion, Appellants acted in all ways fair and in accordance with the rules 
and procedures.  The sale was conducted pursuant to the Rule of Civil Procedure 69C 
and carried out by the Sheriff.  Appellants have expended a substantial amount of time, 
effort and expense in obtaining the execution, and are still expending time, effort and 
expense responding to Appellee’s attempts to skirt the rules, misrepresent the facts and 
frustrate the process.   
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 Finally, the trial court improperly applied the case law in this action.  The trial 
court merely found that gross inadequacy of price and slight circumstances of unfairness 
warrant setting aside the sale.  As outlined above, the sale must also be attended by 
substantial irregularities, which prevent a sale at a fair sum, resulting in a gross sacrifice 
of the judgment creditor’s property.  In the present matter all parties stipulated there 
were no irregularities with the sale. 
 Based on the above, the Appellate Court should reverse the Trial Court’s decision 
to set aside the Sheriff’s sale and vest the property at issue in this action to Appellants. 
DATED this  day of April, 2009. 
DORIUS & REYES 
 
__________________________ 
Jennifer Reyes, Attorney for Appellants 
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